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Naturalism:  Friends and Foes
These days, it seems there are at least as many strains of
naturalism as there are self-professed naturalistic philosophers.
My personal favorite has its primary roots in Quine, though it
branches off from Quinean orthodoxy at some fundamental points. 1
Unfortunately, when it comes to spelling out the precise contours
of this preferred version, there is an immediate difficulty:
naturalism, as I understand it, is not a doctrine, but an
approach; not a set of answers, but a way of addressing
questions.  As such, it can hardly be described in a list of
theses; it can only be seen in action. 2  And this is a long-term
undertaking. 3
What I propose to do here is to triangulate on the position
in two ways that I hope will be illuminating.  For the first
perspective, I trace three conspicuous earlier flowerings of this
naturalistic impulse; though I won’t agree with every opinion of
these proto-naturalists, a look at their practices provides us
with models of the fundamental naturalistic bent in familiar
                      
1 For examples, see the treatments of scientific methodology and the
status of mathematics in [1997] and [200?].
2 I hope this will come clearer toward the end of §I.
2philosophical settings.  For the second perspective, I take up a
range of well known objections to ‘naturalism’ -- including its
purporting interconnections with the theory of truth, a recurring
theme in many discussions, pro and con -- and indicate how the
naturalist I envision would react.  In the end, I hope at least
to have clarified the outlines of the position I recommend.  If
it also comes off as reasonable, so much the better.
I. Roots
The first story I want to tell begins with Kant, not an
easy philosopher to discuss briefly. 4  To make things simple, let
me suggest, without further discussion, that one attractive way
of reading Kant’s notorious combination of empirical realism with
transcendental idealism is to distinguish two levels of inquiry:
empirical and transcendental.  In empirical inquiry, we use
ordinary scientific methods to investigate an objective world of
spatiotemporal objects interconnected by causal relations.  So,
for example, we might infer the existence of an unobservable
because it is related to what we do observe by causal laws.  In
transcendental inquiry, on the other hand, we recognize that this
‘objective’ world is in fact partly constituted by our discursive
cognitive structures (the pure categories) and our human forms of
sensible intuition (space and time); we realize that, viewed
                                                                 
3 [1997] and [200?] are earlier installments in this effort.
4 For a slightly more complete discussion of this approach to Kant, see
[200?].
3transcendentally, certain elements of the world -- its
spatiotemporality, its causal structure -- are not real, but
ideal.
To call this ideality ‘transcendental’ is to distinguish
spatiotemporality and causality from mere accidents of human
cognition that might be studied at the empirical level; rather,
they are necessities for any discursive intellect with our forms
of intuition, and the forms of intuition are necessities of human
cognition.  It follows that we can know a priori that the world
of our experience will be spatiotemporal and causally structured,
and indeed, that spacetime and causation will satisfy certain a
priori principles also gleaned by this transcendental analysis.
So the spatiotemporal, causally conditioned world is real, viewed
empirically, but ideal, viewed transcendentally, and this
transcendental ideality is what makes a priori knowledge
possible.
While it is clear that transcendental inquiry must differ
markedly from empirical inquiry if results of these sorts are to
achieved, it is not so clear what tools or methods or principles
are  involved, or what justifies them.  As commentators have
noted, many of the transcendental claims of the Critique  seem not
to qualify as knowledge claims at all by the explicit standards
of that work.  On top of this comes the further, well known
embarrassment that modern science has falsified Kant’s supposedly
a priori Euclidean geometry and undermined the supposedly
inescapable notion of causality.
4The task of the many neo-Kantians has been to find a
satisfying reaction to these challenges.  In the 1920s, those
distinctive neo-Kantians who would soon become logical
empiricists or logical positivists focused particularly on how
Kant could be reconciled with Einstein.  Two of these were
Reichenbach and Carnap, the one in Berlin, the other in Vienna.
Let’s begin with the Berliner.
Reichenbach’s noble neo-Kantian effort revolved around an
attempt to preserve something of the Kantian notion of a priori
by dividing it into two notions.  The idea was to separate
‘certain truth’ and ‘prior to (partly constitutive of)
knowledge’, with the thought of preserving only the later.  In
this way, a priori principles (that is, constitutive principles),
like those that produce Euclidean geometry, could be revised on
empirical grounds. 5  In reply, Schlick argued that any properly
Kantian philosophy must identify these two notions:
Now I see the essence of the critical viewpoint in the
claim that these constitutive principles are synthetic a
priori judgements , in which the concept of the a priori  has
the property of apodeicticity (of universal, necessary and
inevitable validity) inseparably attached to it.  (Schlick
[1921], p. 323)
In the end, Reichenbach came to agree that claims subject to
empirical confirmation or disconfirmation could hardly be
considered a priori:
The evolution of science in the last century may be
regarded as a continuous process of disintegration of the
Kantian synthetic a priori.  … the synthetic principles of
knowledge which Kant had regarded as a priori  were
                      
5 See Reichenbach [1920].
5recognized as a posteriori , as verifiable through
experience only and as valid in the restricted sense of
empirical hypotheses.  (Reichenbach [1936], p. 145;
Reichenbach [1949], p. 307)
Thus began Reichenbach’s move from neo-Kantianism to logical
empiricism. 6
For our purposes, what’s most important in all this is the
attitude towards philosophizing that Reichenbach developed as he
charted his course away from Kant’s transcendental method.
Consider once again the Kantian scheme:  there are the methods of
science, at the empirical level, and the methods of
transcendental analysis, at the transcendental level; the
transcendental method produces additional insights, one might
even say corrections, to the empirical theorizing of science;
ordinary scientific methods are fine for scientific purposes, but
for deeper understanding, we must turn to the transcendental.
But Reichenbach comes to oppose those who believe
that philosophical views are constructed by other means
than the methods of the scientist … (Reichenbach [1949], p.
289)
Instead, he holds that
[M]odern science … has refused to recognize the authority
of the philosopher who claims to know the truth from
intuition, from insight into a world of ideas or into the
nature of reason or the principles of being, or from
whatever super-empirical source.  There is no separate
entrance to truth for philosophers.  The path of the
philosopher is indicated by that of the scientist … (ibid.,
p. 310)
                      
6 For an historical discussion, see Coffa [1991], chapter 10.
6Of Kant’s two levels, Reichenbach admits the cogency only of the
empirical, the scientific.  Philosophy is part of science,
conducted by scientific means.
This reaction of Reichenbach’s to the Kantian two-level
system embodies what I consider the fundamental naturalistic
impulse:  a resolute skepticism in the face of any ‘higher level’
of inquiry that purports to stand above the level of ordinary
science.  The naturalistic philosopher is a member of the
scientific community; she regards the methods of science as her
own, as the best methods we have for finding out what the world
is like; until some new method is clearly proposed and defended,
she is unimpressed by philosophical systems that place a second
level of analysis above that of science.  Reichenbach frankly
adopts just such a stance in the face of Kantian
transcendentalism.  In light of scientific progress, he abandons
the goal of a Kantian a priori knowledge; he sets out instead,
armed only with ordinary scientific methods, to study science
itself.  In place of the old ‘constitutive’ quasi-a-priori, he
now attempts to separate the definitional or conventional
elements from the empirical elements in our scientific
theorizing. 7  Whatever we may think of the actual results of his
analyses, we must recognize that a distinctive approach has been
staked out.
To isolate the second episode of proto-naturalist
sentiment, let’s return to the neo-Kantian Carnap, back in
                      
7 See Reichenbach [1928].  For overview, see Reichenbach [1936], p. 146.
7Vienna. 8  Like Reichenbach, Carnap hoped to preserve the Kantian
idea that certain elements of our knowledge are ‘constitutive’,
and again like Reichenbach, he sought these elements in the
conventional or definitional.  But here the similarity ends.
Even in his neo-Kantian phase, Reichenbach favored careful
analysis of actual scientific theorizing, but Carnap, inspired in
this case by Russell, turned instead to logic. 9  Early on, this
orientation produced an attempt to construct ordinary physical
objects of everyday experience, by logical means, out of a
sensory ‘given’; 10 later, it produced a focus on language and
syntax.  To see how this difference between Reichenbach and
Carnap plays out, let’s turn to Carnap’s fully positivistic self,
the Carnap of linguistic frameworks and the principle of
tolerance. 11
The general features of Carnap’s thinking are familiar.  A
linguistic framework consists of a set of names, variables,
predicates, connectives, quantifiers, etc., a set of formation
rules for forming sentences from these, a set of primitive
assumptions and deductive and evidential rules.  So, for example,
there is a linguistic framework for a ‘thing language’ with
classical logic; there is a linguistic framework for arithmetic
                                                                 
8 The following discussion of Carnap, Quine, the a priori, and
naturalism draws on portions of my [200?].
9 See Carnap [1928].
10 Actually, out of the relation that holds between a current experience
and a past experience when I recognize them as similar.
8with intuitionistic logic; there is a linguistic framework for
general relativity with complex geometric and mathematical
machinery; and so on.  Carnap’s idea is that we are free to
choose any of these linguistic frameworks that suit our purposes:
In logic there are no morals .  Everyone is at liberty to
build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as
he wishes.  (Carnap [1934], p. 52)
Once we have selected our preferred linguistic framework and are
working within it, some judgments will be part of our adopted
language, or follow from parts of our adopted language by our
adopted deductive rules.  Even if the evidential rules of that
language require empirical input for the assertion of many of our
sentences, 12 there will some others, like the evidential rules
themselves, that are assertable on the basis of the linguistic
framework alone.  From the point of view of a speaker of the
adopted language, these judgments are a priori.
Clearly, Carnap has done Reichenbach one better in the
attempt to preserve something from Kant:  he has preserved a
variety of a priori knowledge.  In some linguistic frameworks,
like the one for general relativity, even geometric principles
will enjoy a priori status.  And Carnap achieves this, as Kant
achieved it, by distinguishing two levels of inquiry: internal
questions asked within a linguistic framework, and prior
                                                                 
11 See Carnap [1934] and [1950].
12 E.g., the ‘thing language’ presumably includes evidential rules that
specify certain experiences as evidence for certain physical object
claims.  The evidential rule would be a priori in that framework, but
the claim that the physical object exists would not follow from the
framework alone.
9pragmatic questions about which framework to adopt in the first
place.  At the level of these pragmatic decisions, we see that
the choice of framework is purely linguistic or conventional, but
once the decision is made and one framework adopted, at the level
of those working inside the framework, the framework’s
assumptions and evidential rules and what follows from them using
the framework’s deductive rules -- all these are absolute,
unrevisable, a priori.
Of course, not all of Kant’s value d outcomes are preserved.
On Carnap’s account, the higher-level, pragmatic decision on
which framework to adopt is a pre-scientific, conventional
decision on what language to use for science; on Kant’s account,
what’s uncovered at the higher, transcendental level are
necessary, absolute truths about the structure of the world as
experienced by any discursive knower with human forms of
intuition.  In other words, while Kant’s a priori truths are
unrevisable certainties of human knowledge, Carnap’s are a priori
only in the sense that revising them would constitute a
revolutionary change in language, not a garden-variety change in
belief. 13
To view this difference from another angle, notice that
Carnap distinguishes sharply between these conventional
linguistic decisions and the philosopher’s answers to what he
calls external questions:
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10
From these questions [questions internal to the linguistic
framework of the thing language, decided by the evidential
rules of that framework] we must distinguish the external
question of the reality of the thing world itself.  In
contrast to the former questions, this question is raised
neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but
only by philosophers.  Realists give an affirmative answer,
subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy
goes on for centuries … because it is framed in a wrong
way.  (Carnap [1950], p. 243)
The problem, as Carnap sees it, is that the philosopher tries to
raise the question of reality outside the scientific framework
whose evidential rules would give the question sense.  The only
legitimate question that can be raised outside the framework is
that of which framework to adopt, and this question is decided on
purely pragmatic grounds:
The thing language in the customary form works indeed with
a high degree of efficiency for most purposes of everyday
life. … However, it would be wrong to describe this
situation by saying, ‘The fact of the efficiency of the
thing language is confirming evidence for the reality of
the thing world’; we should rather say instead:  ‘This fact
makes it advisable to accept the thing language’.  (ibid.,
p. 244)
Here the difference is stark:  Kant’s transcendental analysis is
designed to answer the illegitimate external question; his answer
is transcendental idealism.
More important for our purposes, however, are the
differences between Carnap and Reichenbach.  Though both seek to
identify some portions of our scientific theorizing as linguistic
or definitional or conventional, the structure of this inquiry is
very different in the two cases.  Reichenbach, as we’ve seen,
undertakes to perform this analysis within science, making full
11
use of scientific methods and theories. 14  Carnap, by contrast,
traces the linguistic/conventional elements to a pre-scientific,
pragmatic decision to opt for a particular framework for
scientific inquiry.  Because this deliberation takes place prior
to the adoption of the scientific framework, it cannot be carried
out as Reichenbach recommends, using scientific methods and the
results of its empirical investigations.  On the other hand,
Carnap’s two-level approach does deliver a priori knowledge at
the internal level, which Reichenbach’s cannot:  if our
Reichenbachian scientific inquiry into science determines that
element x is present in our theory by convention, we can hardly
be said to know that the world is x, and ipso facto, cannot be
said to know it a priori.  So Carnap’s two-level approach has
advantages and disadvantages when compared with Reichenbach’s
proto-naturalism:  following Kant more closely, Carnap preserves
a variety of a priori knowledge; at the same time, Carnap’s
approach short-circuits Reichenbach’s detailed intra-scientific
study of the conventional elements in science.
Moreover, Carnap’s kinship with Kant l eaves his position
open to worries parallel to those about Kant’s transcendental
perspective.  At Carnap’s higher level, we don’t ask or answer
external philosophical questions as Kant would have us, but we do
                      
14 Reichenbach himself contrasts the work of his group with Carnap’s
Vienna Circle, emphasizing the intra-scientific approach of the Berlin
group:  ‘In line with their more concrete working program, which
demanded analysis of specific problems in science, [the members of the
Berlin group] avoided all theoretic maxims like those set up by the
Viennese school and embarked upon detailed work in logistics, physics,
biology and psychology.’  (Reichenbach [1936], p. 144)
12
make pragmatic, conventional choices between linguistic
frameworks, and here, as in the Kantian case, we must face the
question of which modes of evidence are applicable:  are we then
operating within yet another conventionally-chosen linguistic
framework, a framework where the principle of tolerance reigns,
rather than another, more absolutist framework?  If so, why have
we chosen the tolerant framework; if not, what is the ground of
these non-conventional evidential rules?  These questions vex
Carnapians much as the corresponding questions vex Kantians.
Still, the most devastating challenge to Kant’s two-level
scheme was the discovery that some of his synthetic a priori
judgments were actually a posteriori (and false).  In Carnap’s
case, the analogous objection comes in one strand of Quine’s
wide-ranging response to Carnap.  In brief, Quine argues that the
evidential rules governing decisions at the higher,
pragmatic/conventional level of Carnap’s model are precisely the
same as the rules governing the adoption of ordinary scientific
hypotheses at the lower, empirical/theoretical level of that
model.  For example, where Carnap would distinguish between the
methods used to settle an internal scientific question about the
combining volumes of various chemicals and those used to settle
the external, purely linguistic, question of whether or not to
adopt the framework of atomic theory, Quine insists that this is
a distinction without a difference. 15  Notice the close analogy
                                                                 
15 See Quine [1948], pp. 16-19, and [1951], pp. 45-46.  For a more
complete presentation of the argument in the text, see my [200?].
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between this objection -- ‘there’s really no difference between
your higher and lower levels’ -- and the older objections to
Kant’s transcendentalism -- ‘your cherished synthetic a priori
judgments are really just a posteriori’.
Here Quine’s reaction is analogous to Reichenbach’s; he
rejects the two-level model in favor of his own naturalism:
the recognition that it is within science itself, and not
in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified
and described.  (Quine [1981], p. 21)
Metaphysical questions -- are there atoms? are there numbers? --
epistemological questions -- how do we humans come to know the
things we do? -- all these are to be treated as broadly
scientific questions, to be answered using the methods of science
and its results.  What’s ruled out is ‘first philosophy’, any
‘supra-scientific tribunal’ (Quine [1975], p. 72) that would
justify or criticize science on extra-scientific grounds.  The
Quinean naturalist ‘begins his reasoning within the inherited
world theory as a going concern’ (op. cit.) and operates ‘from
the point of view of our own science, which is the only point of
view I can offer’ (Quine [1981a], p. 181).  Here again we meet
the fundamental naturalistic impulse.
The third and final episode I’d like to sketch dates to the
1980s, when van Fraassen introduced his ‘constructive
empiricism’:  though we have good reason to believe in what we
observe, we should refrain from belief in the unobservable posits
of our theories.  This is not to say that we should give up our
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theories entirely; rather we should regard them as ‘empirically
adequate’ -- that is, as producing truths about observables --
while remaining agnostic about their theoretical claims.  What,
then, are we to say to the practicing scientist who believes in
atoms?  A first try might be to suggest that she is misstating
her actual position -- that she actually believes only that
atomic theory is empirically adequate -- but this is seems untrue
to the history of the situation.  Before 1905, there was an
important debate over the reality of atoms, one side of which
held that they were only useful fictions, a claim I think we can
safely view as a crude version of empirical adequacy. 16  But the
calculations of Einstein in 1905 and the meticulous experiments
of Perrin on Brownian motion around 1910 proved decisive. 17  Are
we to understand van Fraassen as holding that the scientific
community was in error when it judged the work of Einstein and
Perrin to be conclusive evidence for the actual existence of
atoms?
To answer this question, van Fraassen separates it into
two.  For the practicing scientist, he says,
the distinction between electron  and flying horse  is as
clear as between racehorse  and flying horse ; the first
                      
16 E.g., see the chemist Ostwald in 1904:  ‘the atomic hypothesis has
proved to be an exceedingly useful aid to instruction and investigation
… One must not, however, be led astray by this agreement between
picture and reality and combine the two’.  For references and fuller
discussion, see my [1997], §II.6.i.
17 E.g., see Ostwald in 1908:  ‘the agreement of Brownian movement with
the demands of the kinetic hypothesis…which have been proved through a
series of researches and at last most completely by J. Perrin, entitle
even the cautious scientist to speak of an experimental proof for the
atomistic constitution of space-filled matter’.  (See op. cit.)
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corresponds to something in the actual world, and the other
does not.  (van Fraassen [1980], p. 82)
For the scientist immersed in her science, van Fraassen imagines
that this distinction might even be a methodologically beneficial
one:
We might even suggest a loyalty oath for scientists, if
realism is so efficacious.  (ibid., p. 93)
But he insists that
the interpretation of science, and the correct view of its
methodology, are two separate topics.  (op. cit.)
As far as methodology goes, the actual practice of science, it is
perfectly reasonable for our scientist to take the
Einstein/Perrin evidence as establishing the real existence of
atoms.  But for the proper ‘interpretation’ of atomic theory, we
must adopt a point of view other than that of the practicing
scientist; we must use a method different from that of science:
‘stepping back for a moment’, we adopt an ‘epistemic attitude’
towards the theory (ibid., p. 82).  Only then, answering the
question as epistemologists, do we determine that the
Einstein/Perrin evidence is not enough, and indeed, that no
evidence can be enough to establish the existence of entities
that cannot be perceived by unaided human senses.  Here we have
yet another two-level theory:  at the ordinary scientific level,
we have good evidence that atoms are real; at the interpretive,
epistemic level, we do not.
This time, one voice of dissent comes from Fine.  Why
should we decide, at the epistemic level, to believe in what we
can observe unaided rather than in what we can detect (as Perrin
16
detected atoms)?  After all, the method of detection can be put
to any number of scientific tests:
Faced with such substantial reasons for believing that we
are detecting atoms, what, except purely a priori and
arbitrary conventions, could possibly dictate the
empiricist conclusion that, nevertheless, we are
unwarranted actually to engage in belief  about atoms?
(Fine [1986a], p. 146)
Fine sees no grounds for this higher-level decision:
an attitude of belief has as warrant precisely that which
science itself grants, nothing more but certainly nothing
less … when [the empiricist] sidesteps science and moves
into his own courtroom, there to pronounce his judgments of
where to believe and where to withhold, he [commits] the
sin of epistemology. (ibid., p. 147)
Fine’s own position, which he calls the ‘Natural Ontological
Attitude’ or NOA, includes the fundamental naturalistic impulse:
All that NOA insists is that one’s ontological attitude
towards … everything … that might be collected in the
scientific zoo (whether observable or not), be governed by
the very same standards of evidence and inference that are
employed by science itself.  (ibid., p. 150)
There is only one level at which to evaluate the evidence for the
existence of atoms, and that is the ordinary scientific level,
where even van Fraassen admits that we are justified in believing
in them.
Now we shouldn’t imagine that o nly transcendental idealists
(like Kant) or conventionalists (like Carnap) or constructive
empiricists (like van Fraassen) are tempted by two-level
accounts; even realists occasionally succumb.  To see how this
might happen, consider again the case of the scientist who
believes in atoms on the basis of the Einstein/Perrin evidence.
Suppose this scientist is confronted by a constructive empiricist
17
who claims that this evidence is good enough for scientific
purposes, but not good enough to establish the actual existence
of atoms.  The proper naturalistic response would be to ask what
other purposes the skeptic has in mind, what other modes of
evidence he’s applying; until these matters are explained, the
scientist is surely within her epistemic rights to continue to
adhere to normal scientific standards and to assert the reality
of atoms.  But given human nature, a scientist confronted with
this stubborn agnosticism about atoms, with this condescension
towards her cherished evidential standards as merely ‘good enough
for science’ -- such a scientist is all too likely to rise to the
occasion by trying to defeat the van Fraassenite on his own
terms, by insisting that atoms really  exist.
The fatal flaw in this reaction is that by agreeing
(implicitly) to ‘step back’ with van Fraassen into his ‘epistemic
attitude’, the scientist has forfeited all her actual evidence
for the existence of atoms:  that evidence has already been
declared ‘good enough for science’ but not ‘good enough for
epistemology’.  Having ascended to the higher level, where her
ordinary scientific evidence is no longer relevant, she is left
without resources; this is what leads to the foot-stomping really
of the Realist. 18  Let me distinguish between a lower-case
‘realism’ about atoms in the ordinary scientific sense, supported
by ordinary scientific evidence, and an upper-case ‘Realism’
about atoms which asserts, at the higher, ‘epistemic’ level, on
                      
18 See Fine [1986a], p. 129.
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who knows what grounds, that atoms really  exist.  Our scientist
had perfectly good evidence for her realism about atoms, but in
response to van Fraassen’s challenge, she sets herself up to
defend Realism, an epistemological rather than a scientific view.
By the naturalist’s lights, this is a fool’s errand.
The case of Boyd, van Fraassen’s most tenaciou s
philosophical opponent, is somewhat more subtle.  Boyd undertakes
to show that
a realistic account of scientific theories is a component
in the only scientifically plausible explanation for the
instrumental reliability of scientific methodology.  (Boyd
[1983], p. 207)
Leaving aside the detail of this argument, it is clear that Boyd
intends it to take place entirely within science, using ordinary
scientific methods:
The epistemology of empirical science is an empirical
science.  (Boyd [1990], p. 227)
This certainly has the sound of a purely naturalistic
undertaking.  But consider again our scientific believer in
atoms, the one convinced by the Einstein/Perrin evidence.  While
van Fraassen challenges this evidence at his higher level of
epistemological inquiry, the naturalist remains at the lower
level, the ordinary scientific level, and regards it as
conclusive, just as the scientist does.  Notice that on this
contrast, Boyd sides with van Fraassen:  he, too, sees the
ordinary scientific evidence as standing in need of
supplementation, presumably in response to the higher-level
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considerations raised by van Fraassen.  So, though the
supplementation Boyd goes on to offer is purely scientific, the
perceived need for it is not.  In this sense, Boyd, too, has
bought into van Fraassen’s higher level of evaluation.
Notice also that buying into van Fraassen’s perspective
tends to push Boyd away from the details of the local debate over
atoms and towards global debates over such questions as whether
or not the theoretical terms of mature scientific theories
typically refer.  The naturalist is wary of such blanket
assertions, given the complexity of actual science:  the
particularity of arguments for the existence of individual
theoretical entities, like atoms or quarks; the subtle gradations
in levels of belief in the various parts of science; the
widespread use of idealizations and mathematizations; and so on. 19
At least at the outset, it seems unlikely that a single attitude
towards ‘the posits of mature science’ will be correct across the
board.
On this point, Reichenbach agrees. 20  Speaking of the Berlin
group, he endorses its
concrete working-program, which demanded analysis of
specific problems in science …  (Reichenbach [1936], p.
144)
He writes with approval that
They concentrated on minute work; and hoped to advance the
work of the whole step by step.  (ibid., p. 150)
                      
19 This is a central theme of my [1997], especially §II.6.
20 Also Fine, see below.
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Reichenbach proposes that scientific philosophy proceed by
examining particular theories in particular sciences, e.g., ‘in
logistics, physics, biology and psychology’ (ibid., p. 144); he
himself concentrated his energies on space, time and geometry in
the theory of relativity.  While it is possible that this
piecemeal approach will lead to a uniform theory of all parts of
science, this is neither presupposed nor required as a measure of
success.  Carnap’s fondness for all-inclusive systems was another
central point of disagreement between his Viennese positivists
and Reichenbach’s Berlin empiricists. 21
These, then, are the three historical epis odes that I hope
illuminate the fundamental naturalistic impulse.  Much as I
applaud the reactions of Reichenbach, Quine and Fine, each in
opposition to a particular two-level view, I must allow that I
cannot agree with all they have to say in their pursuit of their
proto-naturalistic projects.  In the case of Reichenbach, my own
expertise is inadequate for a full accounting, but Friedman has
argued persuasively against Reichenbach’s later theory of
confirmation and in favor of a more naturalistic approach; 22 here,
it seems, Reichenbach forsakes the internal, the scientific, in
favor of the a priori.  In Quine’s case, I think the lure of
global accounts -- of confirmation (holism), of ontology (to be
is to be the value of a bound variable) -- has overshadowed the
detailed analysis of actual scientific theory and practice that’s
                      
21 See footnote 14 and Reichenbach [1936], pp. 149-150.
22 See Friedman [1979].
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incumbent upon the true naturalist.  I’ve written at length on
this and my other departures from Quinean orthodoxy elsewhere, so
I won’t go into detail here. 23
My understanding of whe re and how Fine’s NOA differs from
the naturalistic stance I’ll be espousing is compromised by my
uncertainty over precisely what NOA involves.  Many passages,
like those cited a moment ago, sound naturalistic in spirit:
we cannot actually do more, with regard to existence
claims, than follow scientific practice. (Fine [1986a], p.
132)
Trust that science is open to providing all the resources
and nourishment that we who study science need.  (Fine
[1996], p. 176)
And Fine also embraces the secondary naturalistic theme traced in
Reichenbach above:  a preference for local rather than global
analyses in our scientific study of science.  In fact, he
sometimes goes further, declaring outright that there are no
‘general, substantive’ (Fine [1996], p. 176) theories of
confirmation, explanation, cause, etc., indeed any of ‘the
concepts used in science’ (Fine [1986a], p. 149), but in careful
moments, he admits that the question remains open:
A question that NOA must face is whether going local …
means automatically restricting the range of judgments and
principles away from the fully general or universal.  I
think the answer is no.  All that NOA urges is that we not
impose a universalist framework from the outside as a
precondition for trying to investigate or understand a
practice. … It remains to be seen how much universality is
actually required for understanding. … Induction again; let
us look and see.  (Fine [1996], pp. 179-180)
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Fine and the NOAer make an exception to this open-minded policy
in the case of the concept truth -- insisting outright that there
is no theory of truth 24 -- but I’ll leave that issue for later.
Still, despite this agreement (again leaving truth aside),
there are hints that Fine’s posture is not quite that of the
naturalist.  He writes, for example, that NOA means
to situate humanistic concerns about the sciences within
the context of ongoing scientific concerns, to reach out
with our questions and interests to scientist’s questions
and interests -- and to pursue inquiry as a common
endeavor.  (Fine [1996], p. 174)
This suggests that we humanists, which presumably includes us
philosophers, begin somewhere else, somewhere outside science,
and need to be encouraged to embrace the results and methods of
science.  In contrast, my naturalist is simply born native to
late twentieth-century common sense and the scientific attitude
that extends it.  The only decision to be made is whether or not
to go beyond these means of finding out how the world is, whether
or not to add extra-scientific standards of justification to our
repertoire.  The naturalist, holding to her own standards, will
see no reason to do this.
Perhaps these issues come clearest in Fine’s rejection of
‘essentialism’:
NOA is, therefore, basically at odds with the temperament
that looks for definite boundaries demarcating science from
pseudo-science, or that is inclined to award the title
                      
24 See Fine [1986a], pp. 149-150.
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‘scientific’ like a blue ribbon on a prize goat. (Fine
[1986a], p. 149) 25
This passage raises the key questions of demarcation criteria and
pseudo-science.  On the first, I agree with Fine that it is
probably hopeless to search for necessary and sufficient
conditions that separate science from the rest.  Instead, our
naturalist might begin from simple idea that
Science [is] a method of finding things out.  This method
is based on the principle that observation is the judge of
whether something is so or not.  (Feynman [1998], p. 15)
This simple idea brings others in its wake:  the importance of
falsification in ruling out hypotheses, of precision and
thoroughness, of objectivity, of specificity, of theory formation
and the rejection of authority, of universality, and so on
(ibid., pp. 15-28).  As science develops successfully along
various paths, so do higher level norms, like the rejection of
action-at-a-distance, or the emergence of mechanism, or its over-
throw by field theories.  But in none of this do we find
necessary-and-sufficient conditions.  Rather, the moral seems to
be that we do best to keep an open mind on the progress of
scientific methodology.
Now this conclusion might seem troublesome for the
naturalistic approach:  after all, isn’t naturalism the view that
scientific methods are the only legitimate source of evidence,
that we should eschew the extra-scientific; doesn’t it take a
viable demarcation criterion even to state the position?!
                      
25 These ideas, Fine says, ‘bring NOA in line with certain postmodern
and feminist writings’ (Fine [1996], p. 174).
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Perhaps some of my proto-naturalistic precursors would agree to
this, but I hope to take a somewhat different line.  My
naturalist’s methodology isn’t ‘trust only science!’; her
methodology just is  a certain range of methods, which happen to
be those we commonly regard as scientific.  When asked why she
believes in atoms, she says, ‘because of the experiments of
Perrin’ and such-like, not ‘because science says there are atoms
and I believe the methods of science’.  So my naturalist applies
no necessary and sufficient conditions; as a native of the
contemporary scientific world view, she simply proceeds by the
methods that strike her as justified.
Still, though the naturalist can proceed naturalistically
without appeal to any demarcation criterion, a new question
arises when I attempt to describe her behavior in general terms,
when I end up saying things like:  the naturalist has
internalized the standards and methods of contemporary science.
My reading is that in these contexts, terms like ‘scientific
methods’ are informal terms of ordinary language, used in
familiar, rough-and-ready fashion, without the backing of
necessary and sufficient conditions. 26  I contend that what
carries the weight here is not these general terms, but the
individual behaviors: e.g., the faith in ‘ordinary evidence’ like
the Einstein-Perrin case for atoms.  That’s why my efforts to
outline this version of naturalism consist largely (and
                                                                 
26 I hope my general remarks in other parts of this paper will be
understood in the spirit described here.
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fundamentally) of a list of naturalistic reactions in specific
cases to particular challenges.  I count on our shared ability to
extrapolate from these, with no guarantee that all cases will be
beyond controversy.
It’s worth noting that in the historical episodes we’ve
just been surveying, the naturalist’s opponents have often
themselves presupposed a general characterization of science when
they grant that such-and-such is acceptable on ordinary
scientific grounds (as an empirical matter (Kant), as an internal
question (Carnap), for scientific purposes (van Fraassen)).  They
then introduce an explicitly extra-scientific perspective, from
which the view is supposed to be starkly different.  Now again,
when I describe her, I say that my naturalist, born into the
contemporary scientific approach, balks at extra-scientific
demands.  But what actually happens is not that she insists
‘you’re proposing methods that go beyond the legitimate range of
science’, but that she is puzzled:  she asks for a better
description of the new evidential standards being proposed; she
asks to be told why they are needed and how they are justified.
Unless some explanation is given that ties into her own methods,
the ones her opponents describe as ‘ordinary scientific methods’,
she is unlikely to be persuaded that her original grounds are
inadequate.  Again, none of this requires her to launch any
blanket condemnation of ‘extra-scientific methods’.
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So far, then, I agree with Fine that we should avoid the
losing battle of specifying demarcation criteria, but I don’t
think this is enough to keep the naturalist from condemning so-
called ‘pseudo-scientific’ practices like astrology.  The kind of
thing the naturalist might say is once again nicely illustrated
by Feynman, our sample naturalist:
Astrologists say that there are days when it’s better to go
to the dentist than other days.  There are days when it’s
better to fly in an airplane, for you, if you are born on
such a day and such and such an hour.  And it’s all
calculated by very careful rules in terms of the position
of the stars.  If it were true it would be very
interesting.  Insurance people would be very interested to
change the insurance rates on people if they follow the
astrological rules, because they have a better chance when
they are in the airplane.  Tests to determine whether
people who go on the day that they are not supposed to go
are worse off or not have never been made by the
astrologers…
Maybe it’s still true, yes.  On the other hand, there’s an
awful lot of information that indicates that it isn’t true.
We have a lot of knowledge about how things work, what
people are, what the world is, what those stars are, what
the planets are that you are looking at, what makes them go
around more or less … so what are you going to do?
Disbelieve it.  There’s no evidence at all for it. …  The
only way you can believe it is to have a general lack of
knowledge about the stars and the world and what the rest
of the things look like.  If such a phenomenon existed it
would be most remarkable, in the face of all the other
phenomena that exist, and unless someone can demonstrate it
to you with a real experiment, a real test, took people who
believe and people who didn’t believe and made a test, and
so on, then there’s no point in listening to them.
Tests of this kind, incidentally, have been made in the
early days of science.  It’s rather interesting.  I found
out that in the early days, like in the time when they were
discovering oxygen and so on, people made such experimental
attempts to find out, for example, whether missionaries --
it sounds silly; it only sounds silly because you’re afraid
to test it -- whether good people like missionaries who
pray and so on were less likely to be in a shipwreck than
others.  And so when missionaries were going to far
countries, they checked in the shipwrecks whether the
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missionaries were less likely to drown than other people.
And it turned out that there was no difference.  (Feynman
[1998], pp. 92-3)
This straightforward sort of thinking requires no general
characterization of science to be persuasive.  If the NOAer is
reluctant to withhold some sort of blue ribbon in such cases, it
would seem that he isn’t ‘born to the contemporary scientific
world view’, that he hasn’t ‘internalized its methods’, and
hence, that he is no naturalist, by my lights. 27
Let me summarize, then, my description of the naturalist’s
behavior, using rough-and-ready general terms that she herself
need not:  the naturalist begins her inquiry from a perspective
inside our scientific practice, which is, in turn, an extension
of common sense.  She approaches philosophical questions as
broadly scientific questions, insofar as this is possible.  When
faced with a challenge framed in terms of extra-scientific
requirements, she is open-minded but puzzled.  Until the
motivations and standards for this other style of inquiry are
spelled out and justified, she rests with her own evidential
principles, with a healthy skepticism toward first philosophy.
From this perspective, she pursues a scientific study of science,
understood as an undertaking of human beings -- as described by
her theories of psychology, physiology, linguistics, etc. -- who
                      
27 I would also disagree with Fine’s assessment of the status of the
belief that scientific methods are responsive to more than purely
social pressures.  Fine counts this as an extra-scientific ‘add-on’ to
NOA (Fine [1996], p. 185); I would count it as internal to the
scientific theory of science.  The process of weeding out methods that
are largely responsive to factors like social pressure is part of the
process of scientific correction to scientific method.
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inquire into the structure of the world -- as described by her
theories of physics, chemistry, biology, botany, astronomy, etc.
In the process, she aims to understand how and why particular
principles and practices either help or hinder her efforts to
determine how the world is, and she attempts to fine-tune her
overall methodology in light of this understanding.  As simple as
that.
II.  Putnam against naturalism
Having first approached naturalism by describing some of
its philosophical roots, I now turn to the objections of Putnam,
a prominent contemporary opponent.  The irony here is that Putnam
was once himself a proto-naturalist; e.g., in response to Duhem’s
fictionalism, he wrote:
it is silly to agree that a reason for believing that p
warrants accepting p in all scientific circumstances, and
then to add ‘but even so it is not good enough’. Such a
judgment could only be made if one accepted a trans-
scientific method as superior to the scientific method; but
this philosopher, at least, has no interest in doing that .
(Putnam [1971], p. 356)
Ten years later, the author of ‘Why there isn’t a ready-made
world’ and ‘Why reason can’t be naturalized’ attacks both
‘contemporary attempts to “naturalize” metaphysics’ and ‘attempts
to naturalize the fundamental notions of the theory of knowledge’
(Putnam [1982b], p. 229).  This is the Putnam I propose to
discuss here.
Unfortunately, despit e the simplicity of these declared
goals, the target of Putnam’s challenge in these two papers is
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not always clear. 28  At various points in the first paper, he uses
the terms ‘metaphysical realism’, ‘materialism’, ‘scientism’, and
even ‘metaphysical materialism’.  Here the materialist is said to
view physics as the best source of metaphysical or ontological
information, that is, information about how the world is.  Putnam
continues
… we don’t need intellectual intuition to do his  sort of
metaphysics:  his metaphysics, he says, is as open ended,
as infinitely revisable and fallible, as science itself.
In fact, it is  science itself! … The appeal of materialism
lies precisely in this, in its claim to be natural
metaphysics, metaphysics within the bounds of science.
(Putnam [1982a],  p. 210)
This has a proto-naturalistic ring, and indeed, it seems to me
not entirely unfair to tag naturalism with the pejorative
‘scientism’.  This last is a view that Putnam considers not only
false, but pernicious:
metaphysical materialism has replaced positivism and
pragmatism as the dominant contemporary form of scientism.
Since scientism is, in my opinion, one of the most
dangerous contemporary intellectual tendencies, a critique
of its most influential contemporary form is a duty for a
philosopher who views his enterprise as more than a purely
technical discipline.  (Putnam [1982a], p. 211)
For simplicity, I won’t attempt to sort out the precise target or
targets of Putnam’s critique; instead, I propose to consider his
arguments as if they were addressed to the form of naturalism I’m
advocating.  This may well have no bearing on their cogency
against the view or views Putnam himself has in mind, but I hope
it may suit my goal of clarification.
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To begin with, I suspect that the  root of Putnam’s
unhappiness is his conviction that his opponents have failed to
learn the lesson of Kant:
The approach to which I have devoted this paper is an
approach which claims that there is  a ‘transcendental’
reality in Kant’s sense, one absolutely independent of our
minds … but  (and this is what makes it ‘natural’
metaphysics) we need no intellektuelle Anschauung  … the
‘scientific method’ will do … ‘Metaphysics within the
bounds of science alone’ might be its slogan.  (Putnam
[1982a], p. 226)
Earlier, he identifies ‘metaphysical realism’ with Kant’s
‘transcendental realism’ (ibid., p. 206), the view Kant rejects
in favor of ‘transcendental idealism’.  Now whatever other
positions Putnam might have in mind, I hope the previous section
has made it clear that this is not  what I mean to advocate under
the label ‘naturalism’, nor, I would argue, is it what
Reichenbach or Quine or Fine advocates.  The most fundamental
naturalistic impulse, as I understand it, consists in a stubborn
resistance to ‘transcendental’ levels of analysis of any sort; in
the Kantian idiom, the naturalist begins and ends in at the
empirical level.  However strong the human urge towards the
transcendental (Putnam [1982a], pp. 210, 226), it is not the
naturalist who succumbs.
That much is easy:  whatever the naturalist’s sins, she has
not transgressed against Kant’s rejection of transcendental
realism, because she hasn’t risen to Kant’s transcendental level
in the first place.  But there may be more to the Kantian lesson
                                                                 
28 Putnam himself regards naturalized metaphysics as a ‘unified
movement’ and naturalized epistemology as expressed in many
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that Putnam accuses us of having missed, perhaps in some version
of what he calls Kant’s ‘corollary’:
The corollary Kant drew from all this is that even
experiences are in part constructions of the mind … the
idea that all experience involves mental construction, and
the idea that the dependence of physical object concepts
and experience concepts goes both  ways, continue to be of
great importance in contemporary philosophy … (Putnam
[1982a], pp. 209-210)
Now the idea that human cognizers perform some processing on raw
sensory stimulations is a commonplace of contemporary psychology;
there is a concerted scientific effort to determine how this is
done, to describe the mechanisms involved.  Putnam sees more than
this in the Kantian corollary; he sees some form of idealism.
Before we can offer any naturalistic response, we need to know
what sort of idealism is in question.
As we’ve seen, the trick to understanding any Kantian
utterance is to be alert to its level:  we shouldn’t, for
example, try to determine whether or not Kant is an idealist,
tout court, for he is an idealist at the transcendental level and
a realist at the empirical level.  Now Putnam himself so well
understands the difficulties of the transcendental level that he
is moved to suggest that
one’s attitude to it must, perhaps, be the concern of
religion rather than of rational philosophy.  (Putnam
[1982a], p. 226)
So it seems unlikely that Putnam intends his Kantian corollary to
be understood transcendentally.
                                                                 
‘incompatible and mutually divergent ways’ ([1982b], p. 230).
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If, on the other hand, the Kantian corollary is to be
interpreted empirically -- contrary to Kant’s own empirical
realism -- and if we are to avoid reducing it to the commonplace
of empirical psychology -- that human cognition adds some
processing to raw sensory inputs -- then Putnam must tell us
more.  And he does:  it is ‘silly’ to think that
we can have knowledge of objects that goes beyond
experience.  (ibid., p. 210)
For the ‘one idea … definitely sunk by Kant …’ is the view that
We can think and talk about things as they are,
independently of our minds.  (ibid., p. 205)
Of course, Kant didn’t sink this view at the empirical level, he
embraced it, but here our concern is with Putnam.
If Putnam’s point here is not the commonplace of empirical
psychology, then it must be that we cannot hope to know what the
world is like independently of our perceptual and conceptual
processors or independently of our scientific theories.  As a
thesis about psychology or science, this seems either false or
unproblematic.  When psychology tells us that we are prone to
certain sorts of perceptual and cognitive mistakes, it is telling
us that the world is not as our basic processors tend to see it.
Likewise, progress in the physical sciences sometimes takes the
form of the discovery that the way the world most naturally
appears to us is not the way it actually is:  as Einstein showed
that our perception of the world as Euclidean was actually a
parochial take on a larger non-Euclidean universe, or as quantum
mechanics suggests that our everyday ideas of causation are not
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applicable in the small.  In all these cases, careful application
of the scientific method allows us to ‘see around’ our most basic
forms of perception and conceptualization, to better understand
the world as it is independently of our cognitive structures.
And it is clearly possible for us to ‘see around’ any particular
scientific theory; this is how science progresses, by replacing
one theory with another.  So the complaint can only be that we
can’t know what the world is like without using scientific
methods -- something the naturalist is quite ready to grant! 29
In sum, then, it seems that Putnam’s Kantian corollary must
either be a variety of transcendental idealism that functions at
a level rejected by Putnam and beyond the range of the
naturalist, or a sort of empirical idealism that’s rejected by
both Kant and the naturalist and ought to be rejected by Putnam
as well.  Whatever Kantian lessons Putnam’s other opponents may
have failed to learn, I don’t see that this underlying
inspiration for his displeasure with them should carry any weight
against the naturalist.  So far, my naturalist adheres to an
ordinary string of trivialities of science and the common sense
it extends:  the world is as it is (largely) 30 independently of
our modes of perception and conceptualization; by careful
                      
29 Of course this is not to say that we are getting what Putnam
dramatically characterizes as ‘a coherent theory of the noumena …
arrived at by the “scientific method”’ (Putnam [1982a], p. 226).
What we come to know is the ordinary empirical world, not its
transcendental counterpart.
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application of scientific methods, we can gradually overcome our
prejudices and better understand how the world is.
This talk of ‘the way the world is’ brings us to the
doorstep of one of the more specific areas of Putnam’s critique,
the idea that his opponent is committed to the existence of
the one true theory, the true and complete description of
the furniture of the world.  (Putnam [1982a], p. 210)
He elaborates:
this belief in one true theory requires a ready-made world
… :  the world itself has to have a ‘built-in’ structure.
(ibid., p. 211)
Part of Putnam’s resistance to this view is intertwined with his
views about truth, which I postpone to the next section, but
before delving into that question, we should compare Putnam’s
notion of ‘the one true theory’ with our naturalistic
commonplaces.
In some sense, the naturalist does think the world has a
‘built-in’ structure, supposing this to mean that the world is as
it is (largely) independently of our cognition.  Saying that
(most of) the world’s structure is ‘built-in’, in this sense,
only means that it isn’t imposed by our perception, cognition or
thought; this is the part of the world’s structure that we’re
trying to capture in our scientific efforts to screen off our
various prejudices and reveal the world as it is.  This much I
would count as commonplace, but Putnam characterizes his opponent
                                                                 
30 Of course, our modes of perception and conceptualization are
themselves part of the world, so not everything about the world is
independent of them.
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as embracing something more:  the assumption that there is one
and only one theory that reveals the world as it is.  I don’t see
how the belief that the world has a built-in structure forces one
to the conclusion that only one theory can describe that
structure.  Putnam’s case against the ‘one true theory’ involves
purportedly ‘equivalent descriptions’, but let’s not worry about
the persuasiveness of his examples; let’s simply ask why the bare
admission that there might not be ‘one true theory’ should be
troublesome for the naturalist.
There’s a hint of one possible worry in another of Putnam’s
writings:
Any sentence that changes truth-value upon passing from one
correct theory to another correct theory … will express
only a theory-relative  property of THE WORLD.  And the more
such sentences there are, the more properties of THE WORLD
will turn out to be theory-relative.  (Putnam [1976], p.
132)
Saying that the world’s properties are ‘theory-relative’ makes it
sound as if our theories impose their properties, perhaps even as
if the world has no structure of its own and can be imposed upon
in any old way we happen to choose.  Whether or not Putnam
himself intends any of these views, I think the naturalist can be
seen to reject them, again with a series of commonplaces.
To see this, consider a crude analogy:  suppose the world
consists of a deck of cards; then one true theory describes the
universe as made up of 52 card-like objects, another describes it
as made up of 4 suit-like clump-objects, yet another as
consisting of one complex whole.  It seems reasonable to say that
all these theories are correct, that each of them describes
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aspects of the way this world is, that each of them ascribes to
the world properties that are ‘built-in’.  Analogously, our
naturalist holds that the world our science studies has a built-
in structure, that our methods are designed to help us get at
this structure, but she needn’t insist that there is only one
correct way to do this, and she needn’t deny that which built-in
properties we tend to pick up on is at least partly a function of
our cognitive structures and our interests.  And to say that
there might be several correct ways of describing the world is
not to say that every  way of describing the world is equally
good.  The history of science is littered with ways of describing
the world that didn’t work.
But there’s another issue lurking in the background of the
‘one true theory’ discussion, an issue that goes to the heart of
our understanding of naturalized metaphysics.  In Quine’s
original version of the view, our ontological commitments were to
be assessed by figuring out which things our best scientific
theory says ‘there are’; we were to imagine an all-inclusive
theory T, of ‘science’ in the broadest sense, and to search
through its existential assertions. 31  If there are in fact two
equally good theories of the world, two theories that assert the
existence of different things, then it seems Quinean naturalized
metaphysics is in trouble.  To take a simple example, if we have
two complete scientific theories of the world, T and T’, where T
involves points, line segments and lines, and T’ involves line
                      
31 See the classics, Quine [1948] and [1951].
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segments, lines and convergent sequences of line segments, 32 the
Quinean naturalist seems unable to determine whether or not there
are points.  Perhaps even worse, this very approach to
metaphysics seems to attribute serious ontological import to an
issue of theory formulation that strikes most scientists as
entirely without significance. 33
Now it seems to me (as indicated above) that the Quinean
picture of scientific theorizing at work here is too simple to do
the job he assigns to it:  e.g., the existence of atoms was
asserted in atomic theory -- part of our best theory -- before
the Einstein/Perrin evidence that convinced the scientific
community that atoms are more than useful fictions; the existence
of continuous substances is asserted in fluid dynamics, though no
one believes there are such things; some mathematical aspects of
our theories (like the continuity of spacetime) are considered
open questions despite the fact that we have no better way to
represent the world.  The naturalist’s scientific study of
science will happen upon these and related observations early on,
and the moral of the story seems obvious: reading the ontological
conclusions off the face of our scientific theorizing is a
complex and subtle undertaking, far more complex and subtle than
Quine’s proto-naturalist would imagine.
                                                                 
32 See Putnam [1976], pp. 130-131. The idea, obviously, is that the
convergent sequences of line segments of the second theory take the
place of the points of the first theory.
33 See Putnam [1982a], p. 227.
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Clearly, our scientific study of science will need to
address the problem of when and why two theories with
superficially different ontologies are in fact two ways of
describing the same underlying reality; the problem of
differentiating the many varieties of idealizations and some
mathematizations from literal claims, and revealing how they
work; the problem of understanding how our more complex
mathematical machinery is functioning in our most basic theories;
and many more.  But these important and legitimate inquiries into
the structure and function of scientific theorizing in no way
undermine the core of metaphysics naturalized, the idea that
science is the best way we know of finding out how the world is. 34
We must face the fact that this ‘finding out’ is a difficult
task, not something that can simply be read off the logical form
of our theories, but none of this gives our naturalist reason to
suppose that this approach is somehow doomed or that there is any
better way to proceed.
Turning now to Putnam’s epistemological critique of
naturalism, let me first take brief note of a common criticism of
epistemology naturalized, namely, that in foreswearing the
project of answering the Cartesian skeptic, the naturalist also
gives up any normative aspirations.  Putnam repeats this as a
criticism of Quine in particular, while admitting that many
                      
34 As a reminder of the observations at the end of §I, notice that we
put the point this way in describing the naturalist’s practice; she
simply proceeds according to her own methods, unimpressed by proposed
alternatives -- e.g., philosophical intuition -- until their merits can
be established by her standards.
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naturalized epistemologists do undertake normative analyses
(Putnam [1982b], pp. 244-245).  I’m not sure this is fair to
Quine, 35 but in any case, I hope it is clear that my naturalist’s
scientific study of science includes the effort to evaluate and
improve the methodology of science from within, an explicitly
normative undertaking.  So let’s set this issue aside.
A more central theme of Putnam’s epistemological critique
paints his opponents as prone to versions of relativism or
imperialism, both of which he considers self-refuting.  I should
grant that the opponents Putnam sometimes has in mind here -- the
likes of Richard Rorty -- inhabit a different intellectual
province from the naturalistically-minded, but I think,
nevertheless, that an examination of these issues, as they
impinge upon the naturalist, might be illuminating.  So let’s
first ask just how the naturalist might come to be accused of
relativism or imperialism.
Suppose that our naturalist has begun her scientific study
of science:  she calls on her physiological and psychological
theories of human perception and conceptualization, her
linguistic theories of the workings of human language, and her
physical, chemical, astronomical, biological, botanical, and
geological theories of the world in which these humans live; she
uses these, and any other of her scientific findings that seem
relevant, to attempt to explain how these humans, by these means,
                                                                 
35 See, for example, Quine [1981a], p. 181.
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come to know about this world.  Now suppose that along the way,
she also takes note of other human linguistic practices,
practices different from hers.  Some of these, say some forms of
chanting or story-telling, don’t seem to play the characteristic
role of bodies of assertions, but others, like astrology and
theology, apparently do.  Our naturalist also notices that the
evidential standards and norms of these assertion-like practices
are not the same as the ones she uses in her own investigations. 36
How should the naturalist treat these cases?
We might imagine a brand of quasi-naturalist 37 who reacts by
saying: “Clearly their norms are different from mine.  I think
mine are justified, as I attempt to show in the course of my
scientific study of science.  Still, I acknowledge that this
justification relies on my norms; I can’t expect them to be any
more impressed by a justification of my norms in terms of my
norms than I’m impressed by a justification of their norms in
terms of their norms.  Given the symmetry of the situation, I
must conclude that their practice is as good as mine.”  Putnam
objects that when this quasi-naturalist says something like
‘their assertions are justified by their norms’, she’s using her
own norms of assertion, and he argues that this makes it
                      
36 In [1997], I argue that the naturalist will discover that mathematics
is also a seemingly-assertive discourse with norms differing from those
of science, but that the naturalist has reason to treat mathematics as
a special case (see pp. 203-205).  I leave mathematics aside here.
37 This may be Fine’s NOAer, but I don’t pretend to be sure. The
discussion at the end of the previous section even suggests that the
NOAer’s investigation of science may be undertaken from a perspective
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impossible for her claim of symmetry to convey what it ought to
convey. 38
While this relativistic position has perhaps some claim to
be called ‘naturalism’, it is not the version of naturalism I’m
attempting to describe and intending to advocate.  In some cases,
my naturalist might conclude that the seemingly-assertive
practice is actually pursued for other reasons:  perhaps in hopes
of producing a certain spiritual state in the case of theological
discourse or perhaps as a tool in a sort of psychoanalytic
process in the case of astrological discourse.  But suppose the
naturalist’s scientific analysis, drawing on anthropology,
sociology, psychology, etc., determines that one or another of
these practices is  aimed, as the naturalist’s scientific practice
is aimed, at telling us how the world is; suppose, for example,
that the astrologer asserts that human behavior can be predicted
from the position of the stars or the theologian asserts that
certain phenomena are supernatural miracles.  In those cases, my
naturalist holds that the norms of these practices are outright
incorrect, that they are not effective procedures for supporting
the stated claims (recall Feynman’s rejection of astrology in the
long passage quoted in §I).  The others might protest that she
reaches these conclusions using her own evidential standards, but
                                                                 
other than that of science, but this is not part of the quasi-
naturalistic view under consideration here.
38 That is, when she says, ‘from their point of view, my assertions are
justified by my norms’, this claim is justified by her norms, not by
theirs.  See Putnam [1982b], pp. 237-238.
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this she happily grants.    They are her standards, the best
standards she knows.  Of course, she admits that they are subject
to criticism and modification, but only on legitimate scientific
grounds, and neither the theologian nor the astrologer has
presented any such critique.
But perhaps cases like astrology and theology seem too
easy.  The sociologists of science draw attention to episodes
from the history of science when theories or even ‘conceptual
schemes’ different from ours have held sway, arguing that these
alternatives were equally successful at justifying themselves on
their own terms and that their eventual demise was not rationally
justified.  Now the naturalist, with her stubbornly piecemeal
approach, will consider such examples case-by-case, with an eye
to explicating the details of each, but perhaps one general
observation might be offered:  the naturalist’s scientific study
of such episodes will aim to assess the relative merits of the
discarded, alternative scheme; in many such cases, existing
studies give us reason to suppose that the decisions of the
scientific community were considerably less arbitrary than the
sociologists would have us believe; 39 still, it is would be
foolish for the naturalist to ignore the possibility, indeed the
likelihood, that evidentially-irrelevant, irrational factors have
played an unsavory role in the development of science.
                      
39 See, for example, Kitcher’s skeptical treatment (in his [1993]) of
cases studies of Kuhn, Doppelt, Shapin and Schaffer.
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Quine makes a similar point, against the background
metaphor of Neurath’s boat:
The ship may owe its structure partly to blundering
predecessors who missed scuttling it only by fools’ luck.
Ferreting out these improperly-supported passages is a first step
towards the naturalist’s goal of improving science from within.
Still, as Quine goes on to caution:
… we are not in a position to jettison any part of it,
except as we have substitute devices ready to hand that
will serve the same essential purposes.  (Quine [1960], p.
124)
Once the weak planks are found, the next job is find more stable
replacements.  All this is part of naturalism; none of it
constitutes relativism.
There remains the logical, as opposed to historical,
objection that there might be a methodology completely different
from ours that would generate a science completely different from
ours, but would nevertheless be as good as our scientific
methodology at uncovering the way the world is.  I think there is
no denying this bare possibility.  As Quine puts it:
Might another culture, another species, take a radically
different line of scientific development, guided by norms
that differ sharply from ours but that are justified by
their scientific findings as ours are by ours?  And might
these people predict as successfully and thrive as well as
we?  Yes, I think that we must admit this as a possibility
in principle; that we must admit it even from the point of
view of our own science, which is the only point of view I
can offer.  I should be surprised to see this possibility
realized, but I cannot picture a disproof.  (Quine [1981a],
p. 181)
But this bare possibility is methodologically empty.
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At this point, it appears that our naturalist is far more
susceptible to a charge of imperialism than to a charge of
relativism, so it is worth asking why Putnam thinks imperialism
is self-refuting.  As it happens, the argument turns on Putnam’s
understanding of what a naturalist like mine, an imperialistic
naturalist, would have to say about truth.  Thus we are returned
to the question set aside in connection with Fine at the end of
§1:  the question of truth.
III.  Naturalism and truth
What’s striking is that the notion of truth enjoys a
special status in all these discussions.  Putnam thinks that both
his materialistic opponent (in [1982a]) and his imperialistic
opponent (in [1982b]) are committed by the very structure of
their positions to particular views about truth.  And though
Fine’s general approach is summed up in the imperative ‘Induction
again; let us look and see’ (Fine [1996], p. 180), he also thinks
that his NOAer is committed at the outset to a particular
position on truth.  Here the contrast with the naturalism I’ve
been describing is stark:  my naturalist isn’t committed to any
particular position on truth simply on account of her naturalism;
she is committed to a scientific approach to the question, but
this alone doesn’t prejudge or predict how that inquiry will turn
out. 40  Let me glance at what I take to be the current state of
                      
40 This goes for other topics as well, e.g., the status of logic.
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naturalistic, that is, scientific inquiry into the notion of
truth, then return to the arguments of Putnam and Fine.
In fact, I think we’ve already made one relevant
observation in connection with van Fraassen’s ‘empirical
adequacy’.  Recall that in a case like that of the post-
Einstein/Perrin atomic theorist, it seems incorrect to interpret
the claim ‘there are atoms’ to mean that the assertion of the
existence of atoms is empirically adequate:  it was considered
empirically adequate before  Einstein and Perrin; afterwards it
graduated to another status.  I think similar observations of the
practice of science will rule out the range of verificationist-
style notions of truth.  Ordinary scientific practice
distinguishes between the claim that ‘our meters read so-and-so’
and the existence of particles, between ‘we have experiences
such-and-such’ and the existence of medium-sized physical
objects, between ‘it’s useful to act as if there are atoms’ and
‘there are atoms’.  The only hope for such positions is to remove
the discussion to a higher level, where the ordinary scientific
evidence for existence is judged inadequate, but the naturalist
will stubbornly resist any such ascension.
Setting verificationism aside, there remains an ongoing
scientific debate about the nature of truth.  In the early 70s,
Field claimed that Tarski’s theory of truth does not do the full
job of showing that ‘truth’ is a scientifically-acceptable
notion; Field’s thought is that Tarski’s account needs
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supplementation by a robust account of reference (see Field
[1972]).  In the course of this argument, Field admits that
this sort of argument … is only as powerful as our
arguments for the utility of semantic terms; and it is
clear that the question of the utility of the term ‘true’ …
needs much closer investigation.  (Field [1972], p. 374)
In a subsequent paper, Leeds ([1978]) undertakes this closer
investigation, concluding that the role ‘truth’ actually plays in
science can be filled by something much more modest than what
Field has in mind, namely, by a disquotational or deflationary
theory of truth, derived from Quine.  Thus the question is
raised:  does science require a robust correspondence theory of
truth or can all its explanatory purposes be served by a
deflationary theory?  The debate continues to this day. 41
Under these circumstances, what is the proper theory of
truth for the naturalist?  Given the naturalist’s scientific
approach, it seems clear that the question remains open.  If it
should turn out that the purposes of science require a robust
correspondence theory, so be it; if not, the naturalist rests
content with a deflationary theory.  Perhaps it will turn out
that both these options are misguided in some fundamental way.
The only specifically naturalistic commitment in all this is to
follow scientific inquiry wherever it might lead.
With this mundane observation as background, let’s return
to Putnam’s case against the imperialist.  Addressed to cultural
imperialism, Putnam’s argument begins like this:
                      
41 See, for example, Field [1986], Horwich [1990], Gupta [1993], Field
[1994], Leeds [1995].
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He [the imperialist] can say, ‘Well then, truth -- the only
notion of truth I understand -- is defined by the norms of
my culture.’  (‘After all’, he can add, ‘which norms should
I rely on?  The norms of somebody else’s  culture?’)
(Putnam [1982b], p. 238)
Thus, the imperialist’s notion of truth ‘cannot go beyond right
assertibility’ (ibid., p. 239).  The trouble, according to
Putnam, is that our culture does not include a norm of the form:
A statement is true … only if it is assertable according to
the norms of modern European and American culture.  (ibid.,
p. 239)
So, Putnam concludes:
if this statement is true, it follows that it is not true …
Hence it is not true QED.  (op. cit.)
Thus imperialism is self-refuting in ‘modern European and
American culture’, though it might not be if
as a matter of contingent fact, our culture were a
totalitarian culture which erected its own cultural
imperialism into a required dogma, a culturally normative
belief.  (op. cit.)
Our job is to consider how this style of argument might
apply to our naturalistic imperialist.  We begin, again, with the
notion of truth.  To determine whether or not a statement is
true, the naturalist applies the norms and standards of her
science.  From here, the Putnamanian line of thought concludes
that she is committed to an account of truth in terms of ‘right
assertibility’ rather than ‘correspondence’.  But why should this
be so?  When the naturalist is asked to settle a question of
truth, she will indeed appeal to her scientific norms and
standards, but she needn’t view this as a definition  of truth;
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furthermore, we’ve seen that such a verification-based theory is
not likely to emerge from her scientific study of the notion.
Indeed, defining truth as ‘right assertibility’ would convert one
important challenge for her scientific study of science -- the
task of showing that her norms and standards are dependable
methods for determining how the world is -- into an analytic
certainty.  Any theory of truth that trivializes this difficult
undertaking should certainly be rejected.
So, I think my naturalist is clearly not committed to the
Right Assertibility theory that Putnam attributes to the
imperialist.  But Putnam also has a truth-based argument against
his other main opponent, the materialist.  Indeed, in his
[1982a], Putnam goes so far as to define  his opponent’s position
to include a correspondence theory of truth:
What the metaphysical realist holds is that we can think
and talk about things as they are, independently of our
minds, and that we can do this by virtue of a
‘correspondence’ relation between the terms in our language
and some sorts of mind-independent entities.  (Putnam
[1982a], p. 205)
We’ve seen that the naturalist does hold that we can think and
talk about mind-independent things; we’ve also seen that whether
or not this involves a robust correspondence theory of truth is
still open to debate.  This debate will be resolved in terms of
the actual role of truth and reference in the explanations of
science, an idea that was once clear to Putnam:
the success  of [human language use] may well depend on the
existence of a suitable correspondence between the words of
a language and things, and between the sentences of a
language and states of affairs.  The notions of truth and
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reference may be of great importance in explaining the
relation of language to the world … (Putnam [1978], p. 100)
If this explanatory role, or some other, is served by a
correspondence theory in ways it can’t be served by a
deflationary theory, we obviously have strong scientific grounds
to try to develop a viable correspondence theory.  But a
correspondence theory is not mandated by naturalism tout court.
That point made, we should consider Putnam’s reasons for
holding that adherence to the correspondence theory serves to
undermine his opponent’s position; if what Putnam puts forth is a
properly scientific objection, then the naturalist should take
note and factor this into the ongoing debate.  Alas, Putnam
returns instead to the vicinity of his Kantian corollary:
The problem that the believer in metaphysical realism (or
‘transcendental realism’ as Kant called it) has always
faced involves the notion of ‘correspondence’. … How can we
pick out any one correspondence between our words (or
thoughts) and the supposed mind-independent things if we
have no direct access to the mind-independent things ?
(German philosophy almost always began with a particular
answer to this question -- the answer ‘we can’t’ -- after
Kant.)  (Putnam [1982a], pp. 206-207)
What Putnam disapproves here is not a scientific correspondence
theory that attempts to describe a connection between the words
humans use -- as understood by linguistics, psychology, etc. --
and things -- as understood by physics, chemistry, biology, etc.
Rather, what he has in mind is a transcendental Correspondence
Theory -- capital ‘C’, capital ‘T’ -- formulated without the help
of ordinary scientific theorizing, connecting our words with
50
transcendental things in themselves. 42  Obviously this is not the
sort of correspondence theory -- small letters -- that interests
the naturalist in the first place, so Putnam’s critique is
irrelevant.  In sum, then, I think that the naturalist isn’t, and
shouldn’t be, committed to either of the truth theories Putnam
proposes -- the Right Assertibility theory or the transcendental
Correspondence Theory -- and that the jury is still out on what
theory she should embrace.
Let me close this discussion of truth with a few words
about Fine and the NOAer.  While it is sometimes difficult to
reconcile this position with other passages in Fine, 43 he clearly
takes the NOAer to reject both correspondence and verificationist
theories of truth:
Thus NOA is inclined to reject all  interpretations,
theories, construals, pictures, etc., of truth, just as it
rejects the special correspondence theory of realism and
the acceptance pictures of the truthmongering anti-
realisms.  (Fine [1986a], p. 149)
As this passage suggests, Fine’s NOAer also rejects deflationary
theories; though Fine admits elsewhere to some passing fondness
for them, he does not succumb:
Although I am sympathetic to the deflationary approach to
truth defended by Horwich [1990], I still prefer a plain
no-theory attitude.  (Fine [1996] p. 184)
                      
42 Putnam himself distinguishes between ‘a “correspondence” between
words and sets of things … as part of an explanatory model  of speakers’
collective behavior … [as] a scientific picture of the relation of
speakers to their environment’ and the Correspondence Theory involved
in ‘metaphysical realism’ ( Putman [1976], pp. 123-4).
43 See Musgrave [1989] for discussion.
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So the question for us is:  why does Fine think the NOAer should
eschew all theories of truth?
A partial answer comes in this argument against the
correspondence theory:
The correspondence relation would map true statements … to
states of affairs … But if we want to compare a statement
with its corresponding state of affairs, how do we proceed?
How do we get at a state of affairs when that is to be
understood … as a feature of the World? … The difficulty is
that whatever we observe … or causally interact with … is
certainly not independent of us.  … whatever information we
retrieve from such interaction is, prima facie, information
about interacted-with things.  (Fine [1986b], p. 151)
We have here a rerun of Putnam’s argument that the correspondence
theorist needs but cannot have ‘direct access to the mind-
independent things’ (Putnam [1982a], p. 207), a consequence of
his Kantian corollary. 44  In other words, what Fine, like Putnam,
is rejecting is a transcendental Correspondence Theory of the
sort our naturalist would never so much as consider.  Surely we
can agree that this is not the sort of theory the NOAer should
embrace, but this fact leaves untouched the question of the
scientific correctness of the ordinary (small letter)
correspondence theory.
A more complete answer to our question begins from this
passage:
If pressed to answer the question of what, then, does it
mean to say that something is true (or to what does the
truth of so-and-so commit one), NOA will reply by pointing
out the logical relations engendered by the specific claim
and by focusing, then, on the concrete historical
circumstances that ground that particular judgment of
                      
44 Compare Musgrave [1989], pp. 53-58, discussing Fine:  ‘Kant is, of
course, the philosopher who started the rot here’ (p. 56).
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truth.  For, after all, there is  nothing more to say.
(Fine [1986a], p. 134)
So far, this is little more than a reiteration of the claim that
the NOAer has no theory of truth, but in a footnote to the final
sentence, Fine goes a bit further:
Not doubt I am optimistic, for one can always think of more
to say.  In particular, one could try to fashion a general,
descriptive framework for codifying and classifying such
answers.  Perhaps there would be something to be learned
from such a descriptive, semantical framework.  (op. cit.)
This sounds like the sort of scientific study of the role of
truth in scientific explanations that the naturalist proposes to
undertake.  Fine continues:
But what I am afraid of is that this enterprise, once
launched, would lead to a proliferation of frameworks not
so carefully descriptive.  These would take on a life of
their own, each pretending to ways (better than its rivals)
to settle disputes over truth claims, or their import.
What we need, however, is less bad philosophy, not more.
So here, I believe, silence is indeed golden.  (op. cit.)
In other words, Fine is not holding that a scientific study of
truth is impossible, or that it cannot lead to a useful semantic
account of language, but that it is also so likely to lead to bad
philosophy that it should not be undertaken in the first place.
In response to this concern, the naturalist simply trusts to the
safeguards of science.
IV.  Conclusion
I have tried to illuminate the contours of my post-Quinean
version of naturalism first by tracing early occurrences of what
I take to be the fundamental naturalistic impulse in Reichenbach,
Quine and Fine, and by indicating where my naturalist would
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disagree with the further elaborations of these proto-
naturalists.  I then outlined a range of contemporary objections
to vaguely naturalistic projects of various sorts and showed how
they fail to touch the naturalism I’m recommending.  Finally, I
sketched Putnam’s and Fine’s thoughts on the theory of truth and
attempted to turn away the suggestion that a naturalist, simply
by virtue of her naturalism, is committed to one position or
another on this issue.  In the end, I hope at least that the
position has been clarified.  I leave to the reader any further
musings on its viability. 45
Penelope Maddy
23 October 2000
                      
45 My thanks to my colleagues Jeffrey Barrett and Kyle Stanford for
pressing me on these questions (and to an anonymous referee for further
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